[Vol. 103:272 In 2002 the ILC included the topic of shared natural resources in its program of work. The topic was understood to include groundwater, oil and natural gas, and perhaps other resources such as migratory birds and animals. 15 The ILC appointed Chusei Yamada as special rapporteur for the topic. He" considered that it would be appropriate to begin with the consideration of ground waters as the follow-up of the Commission's previous work on the codification of the law of surface waters." 16 The reference to the previous work on surface waters is not altogether accurate since, as noted above, the ILC' s previous work in the field dealt not only with surface water, but also with much of the world's groundwater: that which is hydrologically related to surface water. This point will be revisited below. The special rapporteur also stated that "the work on transboundary groundwaters could affect any future codification work by the Commission on oil and natural gas" and that "the Commission might also wish to take into account some relevant elements of the existing regulations and State practice on oil and natural gas before finalizing its work on transboundary groundwaters."
17 (According to the ILC's commentary on the draft articles, "the overwhelming majority [of government comments on the draft] supported the view that the law on transboundary aquifers should be treated independently of any future work of the Commission on the issues related to oil and natural gas."
18 )
The special rapporteur thus posited a close relationship between the legal regimes governing transboundary groundwater, on the one hand, and oil and natural gas, on the other. He made no distinction between the commonly occurring groundwater that is hydrologically connected with surface water and groundwater, such as so-called fossil water, that is not so connected. As described in the following section, the ILC's transboundary aquifers draft addresses both forms.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES
The ILC's draft on the law of transboundary aquifers consists of nineteen articles arranged in four parts: Introduction; General Principles; Protection, Preservation and Management; and Miscellaneous Provisions. 19 The first of the two articles in part 1, Article 1, defines the scope of the draft as including "(a) Utilization of transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems; activities other than the use of groundwater per se-for example, disposal of waste on the surface ofland in a recharge zone-may adversely affect shared groundwater. Article 2 contains all-important definitions of the terms used throughout the draft. These include (by relevant paragraph of Article 2) "aquifer" (a), "aquifer system" (b), "transboundary aquifer" or " transboundary aquifer system" (c), "aquifer State" (d), "utilization of transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems" (e), "recharging aquifer" (f), "recharge zone" (g), and "discharge zone" (h).2 1 (Note that there is no definition of"groundwater.") The first of the seven articles of part 2, Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer States, proclaims the sovereignty of each aquifer state over the part of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located in its territory. 22 This remarkable provision will be discussed further in the following section. It finds no counterpart in either the ILC's 1994 draft articles or the UN Convention. Articles 4 through 8 correspond to Articles 5 through 9 of the UN Convention. In general, these articles are modeled upon the corresponding provisions of the UN Convention, with appropriate adaptations. Article 4, however, simply refers to "the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization" rather than adjusting the text of Article 5(1) of the Convention setting forth that principle. The draft article then proceeds to state how this principle applies to transboundary aquifers.
23
Article 5 contains a nonexhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in ensuring that utilization of a transboundary aquifer is equitable and reasonable. The list generally tracks the one in Article 6 of the UN Convention (though the factors are reordered), again with appropriate modifications, but adds two factors:" (d) The contribution to the formation and recharge of the aquifer or aquifer system" and "(i) The role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related ecosystem." According to the Commission's commentary, subparagraph (d) refers to "the comparative size of the aquifer in each aquifer State and the comparative importance of the recharge process in each State where the recharge zone is located."
24 Subparagraph (d) thus goes beyond the UN Convention, which does not explicitly include the contribution of water by a given state as an indicative factor-although it may of course be relevant in a specific case and would thus be properly considered. Subparagraph (i) recognizes the importance of aquifers to sustaining the ecosystems related to them. The commentary describes the complex physical relationships characteristic of this function. 25 Paragraph 2 of Article 5, concerning the weight to be given to the various factors, reproduces Article 6(2) of the UN Convention, with appropriate adjustments. But it also adds the concept of "vital human needs," which is contained in Article 10 of the Convention, Relationship Between Different Kinds of Uses (a provision that does not have a counterpart in the transboundary aquifers draft): "in weighing different kinds of utilization of a trans boundary aquifer or aquifer system, special regard shall be given to vital
23 Interestingly, the Commission's commentary on Article 4 distinguishes berween "equitable" and "reasonable" utilization of aquifers, explaining that three of the article's four paragraphs (relating to maximizing longterm benefits, para. (b); establishing comprehensive utilization plans, para. (c); and nor overutilizing recharging rransboundary aquifers, para. (d)) are "more related to reasonable utilization." Commentary on Art. 4, para. 4, id. at 42. 24 Commentary on Art. 5, para. 4, id. at 45. 25 The commentary on paragraph (i) stares that the expression "related ecosystem" should be understood in the context of the use of the term "ecosystem" in d raft Article 10 on protection and preservation of ecosystems. !d.
[Vol. 103:272 human needs. " 26 The intrinsic importance of this principle is magnified by its coming the closest in both instruments to recognizing the human right to water.
27
Article 6, Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm, is the counterpart of the article that caused the most difficulry in negotiating the UN Convention, Article 7. Yet the aquifers draft, rather than simply reproducing it with only the most necessary adaptations, adds a paragraph and rewords the Convention's critical paragraph 2. The additional paragraph arguably is necessary; since it deals with "activities other than utilization of a transboundary aquifer ... that have, or are likely to have, an impact upon that transboundary aquifer, " 28 it will help to prevent an unduly narrow reading of the obligation to prevent the causing of significant harm. Article 6 further reflects hydrologic realiry in requiring that significant harm be prevented, not only with respect to other states sharing a trans boundary aquifer, but also with respect to those "in whose territory a discharge zone is located. "
29 Whether this rewording of the rather awkwardly formulated Article 7(2) of the UN Convention will be judged an acceptable balancing of the no-harm and equitable utilization obligations remains to be seen. The Commission omitted even the weak reference to compensation in Article 7(2), 30 explaining that it is covered "by other rules of internationallaw."
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Article 7, on the general obligation to cooperate, generally follows Article 8 of the UN Convention but substitutes a terse provision for the somewhat long second paragraph on the establishment ofjoint management mechanisms that was added to Article 8 of the ILC' s draft during the negotiation of the UN Convention. According to this paragraph of the aquifers draft, states sharing aquifers ("aquifer states" 32 ) "should" establish such mechanisms.
33
Article 8, concerning the regular exchange of data and information, in large part tracks the corresponding provision of the UN Convention, Article 9. The Commission, however, added what is probably an essential paragraph calling upon states sharing aquifers to develop further data and information on those aquifers when necessary.
34 Another change, which is less felicitous, moved the words "where appropriate" in the final paragraph of the article, so that it reads: "Aquifer States shall, where appropriate, employ their best efforts to collect and process data and information in a manner that facilitates their utilization by the other aquifer States to which such data and information are communicated." 35 The UN Convention's version placed the words "where appropriate" before "process," giving them a more limited effect. Inserting them before all words of obligation in the paragraph considerably broadens their scope and weakens the article. Data and information collected by means of one system may not be usable by a state that employs another system. Yet the sharing of data and information is critical to the proper management of international watercourses, and to equitable utilization itself. Such sharing is particularly critical for groundwater, about which we have less knowledge than we do about surface water. Article 9, Bilateral and Regional Agreements and Arrangements, at first appears to be a new provision. Closer examination, however, reveals that it largely reproduces, with appropriate modifications, the fourth paragraph of Article 3 of the UN Convention, Watercourse Agreements. The opening phrase of Article 9, however, gives rise to some confusion about the article's relationship with Articles 7 and 14 of the draft. That phrase states: "For the purpose of managing a particular transboundary aquifer or aquifer system .... "
36 Article 7, it will be recalled, encourages states to "establish joint mechanisms of cooperation." The Commission's commentary makes clear that these mechanisms are envisioned as engaging in various forms of coordination and management.
37 Article 14, Management, also deals with joint management mechanisms. Why the ILC decided to deal with joint management mechanisms in three different articles, rather than grouping the relevant provisions in a single article, remains uncertain. 38 In addition, it might be asked whether a provision on bilateral and regional agreements and arrangements even belongs in a section of the draft on general principles. Part 3 contains six articles, the first of which, Article 10, Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems, is based on Article 20 of the UN Convention. At first blush, it appears to weaken the latter provision somewhat by qualifying the obligation to protect transboundary aquiferrelated ecosystems with the words "take all appropriate measures." 39 These words generally connote an obligation of due diligence, or making best efforts under the circumstances. While the obligation to "protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses" under Article 20 of the UN Convention is presumably one of due diligence even without these words, this interpretation is not entirely evident. 40 emerges from the ground into a watercourse of some kind (such as a stream or a lake) or into the sea. It is therefore crucial that they-recharge zones in particular-be protected to avoid the contamination of aquifers. Article II provides for the identification of such zones and for their protection from harmful impacts. Importantly, it further recognizes that either of these kinds of zones may be located in a state other than the one(s) where the aquifer is located, that is, the aquifer state(s). Article I1 requires such nonaquifer states to cooperate with aquifer states to protect the aquifer and related ecosystems. 42 Yet whether nonaquifer states would be parties to any instrument based on the draft articles is uncertain. Article I2, Prevention, Reduction and Control ofPollution, is based on paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the UN Convention. It is even more urgent to prevent the pollution of groundwater than that of surface water because once an aquifer is contaminated, it is ordinarily time-consuming and difficult, if not impossible, to restore its waters to their former unpolluted state. One would therefore have expected a detailed and robust provision on this subject. But in contrast to Article 2I of the Convention, which contains three rather lengthy and detailed paragraphs in this regard, Article 12 consists of a solitary paragraph of two sentences. Further, unlike Article 2I of the Convention, Article I2 surprisingly contains no definition of"pollution"; nor is that term defined anywhere else in the draft articles. One would think, for example, that it should be made clear that saltwater intrusion into an aquifer (such as by overabstraction of water from it) is a form of "pollution" for the purpose of this provision. Article 12 does require that states sharing transboundary aquifers "take a precautionary approach in view of uncertainty about the nature and extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and of its vulnerability to pollution." 43 On the surface, this provision appears to be a positive, logical, and even necessary feature, precisely in view of the "vulnerability" of aquifers. But on reflection, the precautionary principle, or "approach," is addressed to situations in which there is scientific uncertainty about environmental harm. 44 Little scientific uncertainty can be discerned about the harm pollution would cause to an aquifer. The Commission's commentary states that a precautionary approach is required in view of"the fragility and scientific uncertainty of aquifers."45 Aquifers are no doubt fragile, in the sense that care must be exercised with respect to their use and protection. T here may also be "scientific uncertainty" about the precise nature, characteristics, and extent of a given aquifer. But, again, hardly anyone appears to doubt that aquifers are "vulnerab[le] to pollution," in the words of Article I2. It therefore seems more appropriate for Article 12 to have enjoined states to exercise a high degree of caution, perhaps even to take precautionary measures, so as to prevent pollution of shared aquifers, rather than to have invoked a principle or approach 46 designed to deal with uncertainty.
42 Art. II (2), id. at 24. 43 Art. 12, id. 44 Perhaps the most broadly accepted general formulation of rhe precautionary "approach" is that of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: "In order to protect rhe environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientificcerrainry shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." Rio Declaration o n Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 3 1 ILM 874, 879 (1992) . 45 Commentary on Art. 12, para. 5, 2008 ILC Report, mpra note I , at 59. 46 The ILC's commentary acknowled ges rhe controversy as to whether iris a precautionary "approach" or "principle" and opts for rhe former on rhe ground that "iris the less disputed formulation." !d.
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Article 13 deals with monitoring, a critical subject in the case of groundwater. The article provides that states sharing aquifers are to monitor them jointly wherever possible, or at least to exchange data obtained through the monitoring process. 47 States sharing aquifers "should" identify the parameters to be monitored, which should include "the condition of the aquifer or aquifer system ... and also ... [their] utilization." 48 Article 14 requires "aquifer states" to "establish and implement plans for the proper management of their transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems."
49 It does not state expressly whether this is to be done jointly or severally, but its second sentence suggests that the latter is intended: "[Aquifer states] shall, at the request of any of them, enter into consultations concerning the management of a trans boundary aquifer .... " 50 Since trans boundary groundwater is a shared resource, attempting to manage it unilaterally would be an exercise in futility, or worse: the consequences could easily amount to a tragedy of the commons. 5 1 Management plans must therefore be prepared and implemented not only domestically, but also jointly, with other aquifer states. 5
2 The article's final sentence provides that "[a] joint management mechanism shall be established, wherever appropriate. "
53 As already noted, this is one of three places in the draft that management is dealt with (the others are Articles 7(2) and 9). Article 15, Planned Activities, deals with the same subject as part 3 of the UN Convention, Planned Measures, which contains nine articles. (The ILC does not explain why it opted for the term "activities" rather than the broader expression "measures," as in the UN Convention.) In view of the sensitivity of aquifers, such extensive compression of the Commission's treatment of this important issue is somewhat surprising. The commentary explains that "a minimalist approach is taken in this draft article due to the scarcity of State practice with respect to aquifers. " 54 Since states look to the ILC for guidance, and since its mandate includes not only codification, but also progressive development of international law, this explanation is not entirely convincing-especially when one recalls that much of the world's groundwater is hydrologically connected with surface water. State practice in relation to surface water is therefore largely applicable to groundwater, as concluded by the International Law Association in 47 Art. 13(1), id. at 24. 48 Art. 13(2), id. at 24 -25. 49 Art. 14, id. at 25. so !d. 51 The reference here is to Garrett Hardin's well-known article, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) . Hardin uses the analogy of a pasture open to all herdsmen. The incentive of each is to increase his herd without limit, leading eventually to the destruction of the commons: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. " !d. at 1244. The same phenomenon would operate in the case of a shared aquifer. 52 See in this connection the "Bellagio DraftT reary," a model agreement for transboundarygroundwater, in Rob- [Vol. 103:272 its Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters. 55 Article 15 begins with a paragraph that does not have a counterpart in the UN Convention but that would have been a welcome addition. It provides that, "as far as practicable," a state (whether or not it is an aquifer stare 56 ) is to assess the possible effects of an activity planned within irs territory when it "has reasonable grounds for believing" that the activity may affect a rransboundary aquifer in a way that could have "a significant adverse effect upon another Srare." 57 The two succeeding paragraphs of Article 15 are based upon Articles 12 and 17(1), respectively, of the UN Convention. They require prior notification of planned activities entailing potential adverse effects (paragraph 2) and consultations if the stares concerned disagree about the possible effect of the planned measures (paragraph 3).
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Part 4 contains the final four articles of the draft. Article 16, a rather ambitious, though wellintentioned provision, purportedly requires all states 59 (not merely aquifer states) to promote cooperation with developing countries with regard to the technical and legal aspects of the management and protection of transboundary aquifers. Like Article 15, this article thus seems to presume that any international agreement based on rhe draft articles would include not only states sharing transboundary aquifers but also others, and that at least some of those other states would be in a position to "promote" the kinds of"cooperation" envisaged in the article.
Article 17, Emergency Situations, tracks Article 28 of the UN Convention, 60 and requires a state where an emergency originates to notify potentially affected states and competent international organizations and to take all practicable measures to prevent, mitigate, and eliminate any harmful effects of the emergency. 61 In an innovation the article provides that a state "may rake measures that are strictly necessary to meet" a threat to "viral human needs" posed by the emergency, "notwithstanding draft articles 4 and 6." 62 Here the Commission evidently had in mind crises such as that occasioned by "the devastating tsunami disaster along the coast of the Indian Ocean," which" could flood seawater into an aquifer." 63 65 and unrealistic compartmentalization of surface water and groundwater, 66 a disaster affecting an aquifer could seemingly be far more destructive than one principally affecting surface water, since an aquifer would take considerably more time to cleanse itself than, for example, a surface stream.
Article 18, Protection in Time of Armed Conflict, is the counterpart to Article 29 of the UN Convention. The text of the two provisions is identical, save for the replacement of "international watercourses" with "trans boundary aquifers or aquifer systems."
67 Both state that the relevant freshwater resources enjoy the protection accorded by international law "in international and non-international armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those principles and rules. " 68 The final provision of the draft, Article 19, on data and information vital to national defense or security, is based on Article 31 of the UN Convention. Again, the substantive text of the two provisions is identical. In the case of Article 19, however, the expression "watercourse state" in the UN Convention is replaced with "state," purporting to make the article applicable to other states as well as to aquifer states. 69 While the commentary offers no explanation for this expansion of coverage, the Commission presumably had in mind the same considerations as regards various other articles in the draft that also refer to a "state" or "states" without modification. 70 Article 19 provides that stares are nor required to furnish data and info rmation vital to their national defense or security but that they should provide "as much information as possible under the circumstances."
71

III. EVALUATION
In general, the transboundary aquifers draft seeks to apply the principles of the UN Convention, mutatis mutandis, to transboundary groundwater. Indeed, as has been seen , most of the substantive articles in the aquifers draft are based on the watercourses articles.
72 Those that are not for the most part consist of refinements relating to the special characteristics of groundwater.73 This provenance validates the ILC' s recommendation in its 1994 Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater that in regulating transboundary groundwater, states 64 !d. 65 For the definit ion of"warercourse" in Article 2(a) of the UN Convention, see supra note 10. 66 As indicated above, most surface water h as associated groundwater. It does nor accord with hydrologic reality to treat the two as e nrirely separate. Su WINTER ET AL., supra note 9. 67 73 The statement rhar provisions of the aquifers draft rhar are nor based on rhe UN Convention "for rhe most parr" deal with the special characteristics of aquifers refers to rhe fact that Article 16, T echnical Cooperation with Developing Stares, is more broadly applicable. Article 3, wh ile inimical to the law of shared freshwater resources as discussed below, was apparently inspired by the characteristics of aquifers.
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4 But it also raises two broad questions: first, whether the aquifers draft has added anything new; and second, whether it has made a positive contribution to the development of the law of shared freshwater resources.
The first question must surely be answered in the affirmative, if only in a somewhat limited sense. The special rapporteur was able to arrange briefings for the Commission by groundwater experts from UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Economic Commission for Europe, and the International Association ofHydrogeologists.7
5 These briefings resulted in imparting a knowledge of aquifers, groundwater, and hydrogeology in general into the draft articles, giving them a scientifically sound basis. This achievement should not be underestimated since groundwater, while much more plentiful than surface water/ 6 is far less understood by states and their political subdivisions. Injecting the language of hydrogeology into the discourse ofinternational watercourse law is surely a good thing and has the potential to inform future agreements and arrangements between states concerning shared groundwater.
The second question, however, cannot be answered so unequivocally-perhaps in part because the Commission became so enamored of the science of aquifers that it lost sight of its main task: the codification and progressive development of the law of transboundary groundwater. In the context of the ILC's work, the difference between the terms "aquifers" and "groundwater," while it may seem subtle, is important. An aquifer is a geologic formation that contains water. The formation itself does not move; it is static. But the water-groundwater-it holds does move. It responds to a variety of forces, from gravity to withdrawals by the state in which it is located or a neighboring state. In short, it is not static. The special rapporteur had initially "indicated his intention to deal with confined transboundary groundwaters" before moving on to other shared natural resources?
7 The decision to make the subject of the Commission's study, and thus its draft articles, the law of transboundary aquifers, rather than the law of transboundary groundwater (or, in the more restrictive terms of the ILC's 1994 resolution, the law of confined transboundary groundwater), may have been influenced by the briefings presented by the United Nations scientific agencies. In any event, the decision had major repercussions throughout the draft articles. These repercussions fall chiefly into two related categories: the physical and legal scope of the draft and its relationship with the UN Convention; and the decision to make the "sovereignty of aquifer states" the guiding principle of the draft. These points will be considered in turn.
The Scope of the Draft and Its Relationship with the UN Convention
First, the ILC's decision to make transboundary aquifers, rather than groundwater, the subject of the draft had far-reaching effects on its physical scope and thus on its relationship to the 74 See note 6 supra and corresponding text. 75 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 18. 76 According to the United Nations Environment Programme, of all freshwater on Earrh, only 0.3 percent is contained in lakes and rivers, while 30.8 percent is groundwater. The remaining 68.9 percent takes the form of glaciers and permanenr snow cover. See Vital Water Graphics (2002), available at <http://www.unep.org/dewa/ assessmems/ecosystems/water/vitalwater/0 l.htm>. In its commentary on the preamble to the draft, the ILC states that "[n]inery-seven per cent of readily available freshwater is stored underground." 2008 ILC Report, supra note I, at 31, para. 2. 7 7 2008 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 13, para. 34.
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UN Convention. The draft defines "aquifer" as "a permeable water-bearing geological formation underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated zone of the formation. " 78 By focusing primarily on the geologic formation, and only secondarily referring to the "water contained in" it, the draft invites confusion as to whether the geological formation (rock 7 9 ) or its content (water) is the primary subject of legal regulation. Unfortunately, the draft articles make clear that their overriding concern is with the rock, not the water. This emphasis is manifested all too plainly in the first general principle announced in the draft, "sovereignty of aquifer states," which seems to have become its leitmotif. The question whether a state enjoys anything but a limited form of sovereignty over shared groundwater bears upon the second category of repercussions, discussed below. Rather than focusing on the geologic formation, the draft articles could usefully have followed the approach of the International Law Association's 1986 Seoul Rules on International Ground waters, which regulate "the waters of international aquifers."
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But even this definition of the draft's physical scope would be too broad if overlap with the UN Convention was to be avoided. The Convention, as indicated earlier, covers all groundwater that is hydrologically related to surface water.
8 1 The only form of groundwater not covered by the 1997 UN Convention is that which does not interact with surface water, that is, water contained in what are sometimes referred to as "confined aquifers."
82 As understood by the Commission when it adopted its draft articles on international watercourses and the accompanying Resolution on Confined T ransboundary Groundwater in 1994, confined aquifers do not receive significant recharge from surface water or otherwise (often because they are very deep) and do not discharge water to the surface or to other aquifers. Some regions of the world, principally the Middle East and N orthAfrica, refer to this form of groundwater as "fossil water."
What the Commission envisaged in 1994 was that additional work could be done "to elaborate rules pertaining to confined transboundary groundwater, " 83 as this form of groundwater not only was not covered by the ILC' s draft articles on international watercourses (or, consequently, the UN Convention) but also had not been considered by the Commission in its work on that project. Yet the scope of the transboundary aquifers draft is by no means limited to confined groundwater or aquifers. It purports to cover the water contained in all trans boundary aquifers or aquifer systems, including those that are recharged from surface waters and discharge into those waters 84 -precisely the forms of groundwater covered by the UN Convention. T he two instruments therefore overlap with respect to all forms of groundwater except 7 8 Arr. 2(a), id. at 20. 79 The term "rock" is used for simplicity. As no ted in the commentary, "[a) 'geological fo rmation' consists of naturally occurring materials such as rock, gravel and sand." Commentary on Art. 2(a), para. 1, id. at 35. 80 Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters, supra note 55, Art. I, at 25 1 (entitled T he Waters oflmernational Aquifers) (emphasis added). 8 1 See the UN Conventio n's definiti on of "watercourse," supra note 10. 82 See, e.g., Commemary on Art. 2, para. 1, 2008 ILC Report, sup ra note l , at 3 5: "Aj[ the aquifers are und erlain by less permeable layers which serve, as it were, as the bottom of [a) container. Some aquifers are also upper-lain by less permeable layers. The waters stored in such aquifers are referred to as confined ground waters as they are p ressurized by more than atmospheric pressure." 83 Resolutio n on C onfined Transboundary Groundwater, supra note 6, pmbl. 84 See the d efinitions of "recharging aquifer," "recharge zone," and "discharge zone" in Article 2(f), (g), and (h), 2008 ILC Report, supra note l, at 20 -2 1. confined transboundary groundwater, a point noted by some members of the Commission. 85 This overlap is problematic for at least three reasons: first, it is likely to lead to confusion as to which instrument should apply to a situation that they both cover; second, the rules applicable to situations the two instruments cover are not perfectly congruent, as noted above; and third, and most fundamentally, the transboundary aquifers draft's use of"sovereignty" over transboundary aquifers as a guiding principle is entirely inconsistent with the UN Convention, as discussed below.
The problems created by overlap might at least have been ameliorated if the Commission had decided that the ultimate form of the transboundary aquifers draft would be a guide to practice that would assist states in their relations concerning transboundary groundwater. Precedent for such an approach can be found in the Commission's proposed outcome of its draft articles on reservations to treaties, 86 and the General Assembly could still decide that the aquifers draft should be used in this way. But, evidently reflecting uncertainty as to how the transboundary aquifers draft would mesh with the UN Convention, 87 the Commission, in its recommendation to the General Assembly on the final form of the draft, suggested neither this result nor the more usual form, a convention. Instead, the ILC proposed what it referred to as a "two-step approach," 88 recommending to the General Assembly:
(a) To take note of the draft articles on the law of trans boundary aquifers in a resolution, and to annex these articles to the resolution; (b) To recommend to States concerned to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper management of their transboundary aquifers on the basis of the principles enunciated in these articles; (c) To also consider, at a later stage, and in view of the importance of the topic, the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles. 89 Presumably, the "two steps" are, first, recommendations (a) and (b), and, second, recommendation (c). Whether or not the last recommendation is taken up by the General Assembly, even "at a later stage," should depend in part on whether the aquifers draft can be made consistent with the law of international watercourses generally, as reflected in the UN Convention, and with the scope of the Convention.
It is worth noting in this connection that the ILC's Drafting Committee decided not to include the draft Article 20, Relation to Other Conventions and International Agreements, 90 which had been proposed by the special rapporteur. That article reads as follows:
1. The present draft articles shall not alter the rights and obligations of the States parties which arise from other conventions and international agreements compatible with the 90 Why the Comm ission felt it necessary to refer ro both "conventions" and "international agreements," since rhe latter is an all-embracing term for treaties, however named, is not known. See the definition of" treaty" in Article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969 , 1155 present draft articles and which do nor affect the enjoyment by other States parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under the present draft articles.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, when the States parties to the present draft articles are parties also to the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses oflnternational Watercourses, the provisions of the latter concerning trans boundary aquifers or aquifer systems apply only to the extent that they are compatible with those of the present draft articles.
1
According to this draft article by the special rapporteur, the trans boundary aquifers draft would prevail over any inconsistent instrument, including the UN Convention. This proposal stands in sharp contrast to the corresponding provision of the Convention itself, which provides that "[i]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the present Convention." 92 In light of the sweeping effect of the special rapporteur's proposed Article 20, its deletion by the Drafting Committee is perhaps not surprising.
A final point relating to the physical scope of the draft is that if it is to overlap with the UN Convention, it seems unnecessarily and unhelpfully li mited in one respect. An aquifer may be situated enti rely in one state but contribute water to a surface stream that flows from that state into another state. Such an aquifer is not covered by the terms "transboundary aquifer" and "transboundary aquifer system," as defined in the draft; at most, it would be covered by the article on "recharge and discharge zones," 93 but the general principles contained in the draft evidently do not apply to those zones, as they govern transboundary aquifers and aquifer systems. Since the principles contained in the draft should logically apply to the waters of aquifers or aquifer systems that are located in a single state but contribute to the surface waters of an international watercourse, such aquifers should be covered by the draft; why they are not remains unclear. Such aquifers are covered by the 1997 UN Convention, but since other forms of groundwater covered by the Convention are also covered by the draft, it would not seem that avoiding overlap with the Convention is the reason that the current draft excludes this particular form of groundwater.
Sovereignty ofAquifer States
The second category of repercussions of the ILC' s decision to study trans boundary aquifers rather than transboundary groundwater relates to the consequent centering of the draft on the concept of "sovereignty of aquifer states. " The ILC' s commentary on Article 3 cites a number of treaties and nonbinding instruments purportedly supporting this provision. 96 Only two of those instruments concern freshwater; none relates specifically to aquifers or groundwater and none refers to sovereignty over shared freshwater of any kind. 97 The only way that either of the two freshwater agreements refers to sovereignty is by reproducing the general formula of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which refers to states' "sovereign right to exploit their own resources" ("in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law") in the context of emphasizing their "responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states. " 98 Unfortunately, Article 3 does not take Principle 2's additional and important second step of underscoring the responsibility of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction that affect trans boundary groundwater do not cause damage to other states. T his may be one reason some states suggested adding to the second sentence of Article 3 the words "international law and" to the version of the article adopted on first reading. 99 That version had only required that a state's "sovereignty over ... a transboundary aquifer" be exercised "in accordance with the present draft articles."
If the subject matter being regulated is an immovable part of the territory of states, it is only natural to conceive of states as having "sovereignty" over it. Bur if the subject matter is something that moves from one state to another, from underground to surface, from surface to atmosphere, from atmosphere back to surface, and so on in the hydrologic cycle, the notion that states have sovereignty over it seems a far from perfect match. Considering the language of Article 3 and the commentary on the draft, the Commission seems to have had the first kind of subject matter in mind: both refer to a part of an aquifer "located" within a state's territory. According to the commentary, "In essence, each aquifer State has sovereignty over the transboundary aquifer or aquifer system to the extent located within its territory."
100 An aquiferrock-can be "located" within a state. The term "located," which is used in the sense of "situated,"
101 does not accurately describe something moving, such as water flowing through an aquifer. A substance moving from one state to another is not something that accords with 96 Commentary on Art. 3, id. at 39 n.24.
97 This is not the place for an analysis of each of the treaties and nonbinding instruments referred to in note 24 of the ILC's commentary. Suffice it to say that they relate to a wide variery of subject marrers, from the ozone layer and biodiversity to succession of states and the law of the sea. Only rwo of the instruments actually concern freshwater, and one of those, rhe 2003 Convention on the Sustainable Development of Lake Tanganyika, reproduces Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Enviro nment and Development, supra noce 44, in its preamble. Many of rhe ocher instruments cited reproduce Principle 2 as well. In providing that "Srares have .. . rhe sovereign right to exploit their own resources," 31 ILM at 876 (emphasis added), Principle 2 is not saying rhe same thing as that states have "sovereignty over" those resources; nor is there any reference to shared natu ral resources. The orher instrument relating to freshwater, the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health ro the 1992 ECE Convention on rhe Protection and Use ofTransboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, also rep roduces Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration in its Article 5(c). Not one insrrumenr cited is devoted to transboundary groundwater. 98 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 44, princ. 2, 31 ILM at 876. normal conceptions of what falls under a state's sovereignry: its territory, including its territorial sea.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking of a treary with Canada concerning migratory birds, captured the idea well in a case involving the U.S. state of Missouri's claim of exclusive authoriry over the birds. 103 Justice Holmes observed that such a claim rested on "the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away."
104 He declared: "Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. ... But for the treary and the [implementing] statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with."
105 Similarly, without cooperation with other states sharing transboundary groundwater, an approach afforded little incentive by the idea of sovereignry, "there soon might be no [groundwater] for any powers to deal with." With regard to water in particular, the first Restatement of Torts captures the idea eloquently:
Water, like air and light, is a fugitive, wandering thing, flowing over and through land, but seldom remaining for any length of time in one place or within the confines of any one person's possession. One's dominion over it while it is upon his land is temporary, and since it ordinarily flows onto the lands of other persons, it is a thing common to the lands of all through whose possession it passes. Unlike air, it is limited in quantiry, and a substantial use of it by one may prevent others from having it .... [T]he rights and privileges of individual users are subject to greater limitation out of regard for the common interests of all. 106 In short, the rights of a state in the groundwater contained in the portion of a transboundary aquifer within its territory are unlike those the state enjoys over its land territory. Shared groundwater may move slowly, but it does move; it is more akin in this respect to the migratory bird or the flowing stream than the geologic formation constituting an aquifer. For that reason, states have long recognized that their rights in shared freshwater resources are not appropriately described with reference to the concept of sovereignry.
107 Instead, they have accepted that they each have rights in the shared resource and obligations with respect to it, and that the determination of their respective shares of the resource is governed by the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. 108 The UN Convention and all drafts on the law of international watercourses prepared by scholarly and professional organizations 109 reject as both unhelpful and unsupported by state [Vol. 103:272 practice the notion that a state "has sovereignty over the portion of" shared freshwater resources located within its territory. According to these authorities, and the ILC's own work on international watercourses, 110 the doctrine of sovereignty does not apply to shared freshwater resources in any way that resembles its application to land territory. The confusion regarding the applicability of sovereignty to shared groundwater may have been engendered by the definition of the term "aquifer," as discussed above, and also by the special rapporteur's having linked the legal regimes governing transboundary aquifers and shared hydrocarbons. 1 1 1 The special rapporteur thus posited a dose relationship between the legal regimes governing transboundary groundwater, on the one hand, and shared hydrocarbon resources, on the other, a novel notion 112 whose validity is highly doubtful in view of the entirely separate development of the two regimes.
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, which involved both surface water and ground- The ICJ therefore confirmed that the principle of community of interest applies to nonnavigational uses of international watercourses. As has been seen, the UN Convention defines the term "watercourse" to include both surface water and groundwater that interacts with it, and the Court was surely aware of that d efinition. 115 The notion of" sovereignty" over the portion of shared freshwater resources situated in a state's territory is incompatible with the principle of community of interest in those resources. The concept of "sovereignty" over shared 112 The ILC's previous work on shared freshwater resources did nor rely ar all on rhe legal regimes governing shared oil and natural gas. See the draft articles and commentaries on the law ofinternational watercourses adopted by the Commission in 1994, 1994 ILC Reporc, supra note 3, at 89. The same is true of the work of the Instirut d e droit international and the International Law Association, supra note 109.
11 3 The surface water was, of course, the Danube River, on a long stretch of which the project was located. The groundwater was rhar associated with the surface water, primarily in the vicinity of the GabC!kovo barrage, bur also in wells farther downstream near the banks of the river ("bank-filtered wells"). See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Siovk.), 1997 ICJ REP. 7, 35-36, para. 40; 43, para. 56; & 74, para. 127 (Sept. 25). groundwater cannot possibly be squared with "the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others." In the Oder case, the Permanent Court ruled against Poland's contention that the international regime of two tributaries of the Oder should extend only up to the Polish border-effectively, an argument that Polish sovereignty over those rivers once they crossed the Polish border made them noninternational. The Court based its decision largely on the "community of interest" principle, which the ICJ applied to non-navigational uses in the passage quoted above. The ICJ may thus be said to have rejected the notion that a state has "sovereignty" over the portion of an international watercourse (including groundwater) that is situated in its territory. Rather, other states sharing that resource have an "interest" in it together with the territorial state. The states sharing the interest form a "community" whose existence is based on the fact that they share the resource.
Unfortunately, in its commentary on Article 3 the Commission does not clarify what it intended to imply by a state's "sovereignty" over the portion of a transboundary aquifer located in its territory. The first sentence of that commentary states as follows:
The need to have an explicit reference in the form of [a] draft article to the sovereignty of States over the natural resources within their territories was reaffirmed by many States, particularly by those aquifer States that are of the opinion that water resources belong to the States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States.
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This characterization of the views of some states supporting Article 3, specifically the clause beginning with "particularly," is breathtaking in both its comprehensiveness and its absoluteness: the expression "water resources" is not qualified, meaning that it would include all forms of shared freshwater resources, not only transboundary groundwater; and these states are said to take the view that water resources "belong" to the states where they are located and "are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States." This statement strongly echoes the infamous "Harmon Doctrine" of absolute sovereignty over international watercourses, 11 7 which has long since been discredited, not least by the state of its origin, the United States.
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Nevertheless, one may question whether "many" states actually expressed the view that an article on sovereignty over transboundary aquifers was needed. One measure of the strength of a state's commitment to a provision of an ILC draft is whether it submits written comments on the provision as adopted on first reading in response to the Commission's request. [Vol. 103:272 aquifers draft as a whole, when the ILC adopted the draft articles on first reading in 2006: only a small number of states explicitly supported the notion of sovereignty over transboundary aquifers and no governments stated that they supported the proposition that "water resources belong to the States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States."
120 Specifically, the Commission reports that only eighteen states submitted comments on the draft articles as adopted on first reading and, of those, only six (Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Israel, Portugal, and Turkey) commented on draft Article 3.
12 1 Of those six states, three (Austria, Brazil, and Turkey) are upstream or predominantly upstream, one (Israel) is upstream on one of the four aquifers it shares with the Palestinians, one (Portugal) is predominantly downstream, and one (Cuba) has no international watercourses. (Historically, to the extent that sovereignty over shared freshwater resources has been asserted, upstream states have generally been the ones to have done so.) Of these states, only Portugal commented that cooperation should be emphasized and that the ILC should "reflect upon whether or nor to shift towards a more actual and mitigated doctrine of sovereignty."
122 The remaining five offered varying degrees of support for Article 3, although two of these insisted that the article be amended to provide rhar a state's sovereignty over transboundary aquifers should be exercised in accordance with international law. 123 One of these stares explained that it "does not support the making of exceptions to accepted customary international law on this issue."
124 All told, among the states with international watercourses (including transboundaryaquifers) that commented, four would not seem to qualify as "many." Additional governments may have made specific oral comments on Article 3 during the annual discussion of the Commission's reports in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly. However, the topical summaries of those debates in 2006 and 2007 125 indicate that only "some" delegations addressed Article 3, and that they made substantially the same points as were made in the written comments and referred to in the Commission's commentary.
126
Even if the number of states arguing the" need" for a provision on sovereignty over the portion of shared natural resources within their territories had been greater, that alone should not have been enough to persuade the Commission to include such a provision in its draft in the face of contrary state practice. Traditionally, in carrying out its task of the "progressive development of international law and irs codification,"
127 the ILC has taken into account all the forms of sources and evidence of international law, emphasizing state practice. Yet, as seen, in this case it was able to identify no state practice supporting the notion of a state's having sovereignty over the portion of transboundary groundwater in its territory. The ILC should have recognized that like the infamous and discredited Harmon Doctrine, 128 these comments, by apparently bur a few states, in support of the notion of sovereignty over transboundary aquifers reflect not state practice bur advocacy of a position they considered supportive of their interests. Whether making such an argument concerning trans boundary aquifers could ever be supportive of a stare's interest is discussed below.
In addition to the lack of support in state practice for the notion of sovereignty over shared groundwater, three specific dangers relate to the use of the concept of sovereignty in this context. First, it will reinforce the historic tendency of some states to claim absolutesovereigntyover the portion in their territories of even transboundary surface waters. As indicated above, such claims have long been discredited and are clearly contrary to contemporary international law. In this connection the International Court of] us rice in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros case referred to a state's "basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse."
129 Indeed, the Commission's transboundary aquifers draft includes equitable and reasonable utilization as a general principle.
130 The indeterminate, yet powerful, concept of "sovereignty" is anything but compatible with and supportive of the principle of "an equitable and reasonable sharing" to which states have a "basic right." "Sharing" of transboundary freshwater and "sovereignty" over it even seem mutually exclusive. Article 3's declaration that a state has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer in its territory risks reopening what had been considered a long-dead debate between adherents of the "absolute territorial sovereignty" theory and those of the "absolute territorial integrity" theory, 131 as well as encouraging states to make claims that can only generate disputes.
Second, the notion of"sovereignty" may give a state the idea that it has absolute discretion concerning the water contained in a trans boundary aquifer when in fact and in law it does not. It may get this idea notwithstanding the statement in the second sentence of draft Article 3 that the state "shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international law and the present draft articles." The damage has already been done in the first sentence, as it clearly implies that sovereignty is the guiding principle and that the remainder of the draft must be interpreted in that light. The comments of one state evidence acceptance of this implication by supporting the notion of sovereignty of aquifer states because it "emphasiz[es] that sovereignty is the fundamental rule on which the entirety of the draft articles is based so that the latter have to be interpreted accordingly."
132 Thus, the first sentence of Article 3 lets the genie of sovereignty out of the bottle, and the second sentence cannot put it back in. The state is clearly sovereign over the water-bearing geologic formation itself, up to the point where the border intersects it.
133 It has rights of use in, but nor sovereignty over, the water contained in that formation. as the basis for negotiating a convention. 137 The Assembly followed this recommendation in a resolution adopted in December 2008.
138 If the General Assembly ultimately does decide to convene a conference to negotiate such a convention, the integrity of the legal regime thus established will crucially depend on eliminating both the overlap between the draft and the UN Convention in terms of the physical subject matter they regulate, and the notion of "sovereignty" over shared groundwater, which should have no place in any set of rules governing the use, protection, and management of shared freshwater resources.
